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The Sullivan Decision*
Anthony Lewis**
Professor Stephens, 124 ladies and gentlemen, thank
you for letting me join in this great celebration of a great
case. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan125 was, and remains,
one of the most remarkable judicial decisions of my
lifetime. In commenting on it, I must begin with a
confession. I watched the case from its beginnings. I
worked for The New York Times when the libel action was
brought, and I covered the case in the Supreme Court.
Professor Herbert Wechsler, who briefed and argued the
case, was a revered teacher of mine. In the forty years
since the case was decided, I have written and talked about
it innumerable times.
But - now the confession - over those years I have
found, again and again, that I did not altogether understand
the decision. That has been true from the beginning.
Recently, I had occasion to look back at the story I wrote
on March 9, 1964, which appeared on the front page of The
Times the next morning. To my chagrin, I found that in
significant part I had gotten it wrong. It was only much
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later in teaching the case that I began to penetrate its
mysteries.
The Sullivan decision had diverse, far-reaching
consequences. It revolutionized the law of libel in the
United States. It gave new meaning - broader meaning - to

the constitutional protections of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, and it removed a serious threat to the
civil rights movement, whose success in the 1960s so
greatly changed this country.
The sweeping character of Justice Brennan's
opinion of the Court is signaled by its opening words. "We
are required in this case," it begins, "to determine for the
first time the extent to which the constitutional protections
for speech and press limit a State's power to award
damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct." 126 Of course, no one
can require the Supreme Court to decide anything. That
opening declaration is a bit like that of another
revolutionary decision, Erie Railroadv. Tompkins ,l27
which in 1938 stripped the federal courts of their power to
rmke common law on state questions. Justice Brandeis's
opinion began: "[t]he question for decision is whether the
oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be
disapproved."'' 28 This, however, was not the question
presented by the parties. It was the question that the
Justices, especially Justice Brandeis, wanted to decide.
Please forgive the digression. I want only to point
out that the scope of what the Supreme Court decided in
New York Times v. Sullivan - the grand scale, the grand
style - was a choice made by the Justices, and very much
by the author of the Court's opinion, Justice Brennan.
To appreciate how great an impact the case had on
American law and American society, we have to take
"' Id.
at 256.
127

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ourselves back to the year when the libel action started,
1960. We have to understand two things about that time:
what the state of race relations was, and what limits the
United States Constitution put on libel judgments. The
events of 1960 came six years after the Supreme Court, in
Brown v. Board of Education,129 had held racial segregation
to be unlawful in public education. Yet, in that year not a
single black child attended a public school with white
children in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, or
South Carolina. The state universities remained segregated
in those same states. Blacks were prevented from voting in
large parts of the Deep South by force or trick. In 1960,
only four percent of black citizens of voting age had
managed to register to vote in Mississippi, and only 14
percent in Alabama.
Those were the realities that Martin Luther King, Jr.
and his colleagues were trying to change, along with
segregation in the rest of life, in hospitals and cemeteries
and department stores. Dr. King had an idea, an optimistic
one. He thought that most Americans, if confronted with
the ugliness and brutality of racism, would disapprove. It
was true that most Americans at that time were actually
unfamiliar with the realities of racism. Dr. King set out to
confront them with those realities. The press, both print
and broadcast, had an essential part to play if Dr. King's
optimistic strategy was to work. It was the media that
would show Americans the ugly reactions to the civil rights
movement: the snarling police dogs, the assaults on black
and white passengers on interstate buses when they reached
terminals in Alabama, the sheriffs who threatened would-be
black voters. Newspapers and magazines did a good job of
reporting those episodes, and television had an even greater
impact.

129

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Professor Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law
School, after the confrontations over school desegregation
in New Orleans and Little Rock, wrote that racial
segregation had been an abstraction to most Americans.
The riots, he said, "showed what it means concretely. Here
were grown men and women furiously confronting their
enemy: two, three, a half dozen scrubbed, starched, scared
and incredibly brave colored children. The moral
bankruptcy, the shame of the thing, was evident."13 °
I need not go into the advertisement in the Times, or
Commissioner Sullivan's claim that he was libeled by it,
although it did not mention his name when it denounced
"Southern violators" of the Constitution. This audience
knows all about that. I simply do what Justice Holmes
once said was necessary: elucidate the obvious. The
purpose of that libel action, and of others that were brought
soon after, was to frighten the national press out of
covering the civil rights movement in the South.
It was a serious threat. An all-white jury awarded
Commissioner Sullivan all the damages he claimed
$500,000. Another jury returned a verdict for the same
amount in another official's libel action over the
advertisement. Altogether, The Times was going to owe
over $2,500,000 in libel damages from the ad - and no
doubt more in suits over new stories in the paper. It was
enough to put the paper out of business in those days.
Other lawsuits targeted magazine and broadcast
entities. After the judgment for Commissioner Sullivan,
the Montgomery Advertiser headlined a story: "State Finds
Formidable Legal Club to Swing at Out-of-State Press. 13 '
That brings me to the second thing that has to be
understood about the year 1960: the state of libel law.
130 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE

SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).

131 Rex Thomas, State FindsFormidableLegal Club To Swing At OutOf-State Press, MONTGOMERY

ADVERTISER, Sept.

25, 1960, at Al.
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There were no constitutional constraints then - none - on

libel judgments. Libel was entirely a matter of state law,
regarded from the beginning as being outside the First
Amendment. No libel award, however outlandish, had ever
been found to violate the Federal Constitution. An
associate at the law firm that for years had represented The
New York Times wrote an article for the paper's house
organ, Times Talk, about how the lawyers planned to
appeal the judgment for Commissioner Sullivan. He did
not mention the First Amendment.
In hindsight, it all looks so obvious. Here was a
lawsuit aimed at cutting off publication of a comment on a
central political issue. How could it more directly engage
the First Amendment? But that perspective is plain only in
hindsight. At the time, Commissioner Sullivan's lawyer,
Roland Nachman, thought the First Amendment was a
March hare, not worth pursuing. The Alabama Supreme
Court dismissed it in a sentence. When Professor Wechsler
raised the idea of a First Amendment argument with Times
executives, some of them were wary of such a novel idea.
But Professor Wechsler boldly told the Supreme Court in
his brief that this was a classic test of First Amendment
values. "This is not a time," he said, "there never is a time
- when it would serve the values enshrined in the
Constitution to force the press to curtail its attention to the
tensest issues that confront the country .... 132
The challenge to Professor Wechsler was the long
history of universal acceptance that libel fell outside the
reach of the First Amendment. He answered that history
with another history, the history of the struggle against the
Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime to criticize the
President. "Though the Sedition Act was never passed on
by this Court," Wechsler wrote, "the verdict of history
132 Herbert Wechsler, Brief for the Petitioner, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ((Nos. 39, 40) availableat 1963 WL
66441 ,*68).
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that it was inconsistent with the
surely sustains the view
33
First Amendment." 1
Justice Brennan put that history at the heart of his
opinion. "Although the Sedition Act was never tested in
this Court," he wrote, "the attack upon its validity has
carried the day in the court of history."' 134 With that, he and
the Court in effect held unconstitutional a statute that had
expired 163 years earlier, in 1801. It was the great
controversy over the Sedition Act, Justice Brennan said,
with James Madison leading the attack, that "first
crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of
the First Amendment,"135 that is, the right of Americans to
criticize officials whom they choose to govern them.
That is one constitutional theme in the Sullivan
opinion. It is buttressed by pages of quotation from some
of the great free speech opinions in American law. They
show, Justice Brennan said, "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public
136
officials.'
To this Justice Brennan added a second ground, not
so often noticed, but I think extremely important. Officials
have a privilege not to be sued over statements made in the
course of their duties. An analogous privilege is needed by
"the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to
criticize as it is the official's duty to administer.' 37 The
idea comes straight from Justice Brandeis, who once said
the most important office in a democracy was the office of
citizen.
...Id. at 47.
114 376 U.S. at 276.
' Id. at 273.
13 6 Id. at 270.
137 Id. at 282.
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From today's standpoint, again, the enshrining of
the right to criticize government as a central meaning of the
First Amendment seems unchallengeably correct. But we
think that in good part because of New York Times v.
Sullivan. It was the first opinion for a majority of the
Supreme Court that so broadly spread the mantle of free
expression. Many of the ringing words about freedom that
we remember by, for example, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, appeared in dissenting and concurring opinions.
It was Holmes in dissent who said, "we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinion
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death .... 38
Notice also that Holmes spoke of freedom for
"opinion." The Sullivan case involved something very
different: facts. False facts, because The Times admitted
and the Court found that there were errors in the
advertisement that was the subject of this libel action.
Justice Brennan said the lesson to be drawn from the
Sedition Act controversy was that "neither factual error nor
defamatory content," nor a combination of the two,
"suffices to remove the constitutional shield from the
criticism of official conduct.... ,,139
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have to confront
one of the mysteries of the Court's opinion in New York
Times v. Sullivan. Through all of the discussion about the
Sedition Act, the quotations from Madison and Brandeis,
Justice Brennan seemed to be taking an absolute view of
the right to criticize government. Madison certainly did,
saying that "abuse" by the press must be accepted as part of
the price of freedom. 140 Indeed, at the oral argument of the
case, Justice Brennan asked whether there were "any limits
whatever" to the right to criticize officials. Professor
138

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.

dissenting).
1'9
14 0 Id. at 273.
Id. at 271.
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Wechsler answered that, "if I take my instruction from
James Madison" there were none. Justice Brennan said:
"You say, then, the First Amendment gives, in effect, an
absolute privilege to criticize.... 141
But that is not the holding of the Sullivan case.
Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg urged that outcome,
calling for absolute immunity for attacks on officials. The
opinion of the Court, however, stopped well short of
absolute immunity. It held that a public official could not
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood "unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." 142 That is the
famous Sullivan formula, allowing the libel plaintiff to
recover damages if he can show that he was defamed by a
falsehood that was deliberate - a knowing lie - or reckless.
Why did Justice Brennan and the Court stop short
of total freedom to criticize? Why did they leave a
loophole for official libel actions that has led to much
litigation about what kind of falsehood is "reckless?" (The
Court in time said it was a statement published despite
subjective awareness of probable falsity.)
Some have speculated that Justice Brennan really
preferred the absolute Madisonian position but drew back
in order to carry a majority of his colleagues with him. I
am sure that was not the case. In the draft opinion he
showed to his law clerks a few weeks after argument - the
first of eight drafts - he noted Wechsler's argument that
Madison would have:
barred sanctions against defamatory criticism of
public officials reflecting upon their official
141

Audio tape: Oral Argument of N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, U.S.

Supreme Court (Jan. 6, 1964), at
http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/277/audioresources.
142

Id. at 279-80.
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conduct even when tainted with express malice.
We do not think that the Amendment reaches so
far . . . . The line may surely be drawn to
exclude from constitutional protection the
statement which is not criticism, or intended as
such, but, in the guise of criticism, is deliberate,
malevolent and knowing falsity, or utterance
reckless of the truth ....
This was the age of Senator Joe McCarthy and antiCommunist demagoguery.
In another libel case decided shortly after Sullivan,
Garrisonv. Louisiana,144 Justice Brennan's opinion of the
Court explained why absolute immunity for defamatory
false statements about officials was an unwise idea:
At the time the First Amendment was adopted,
as today, there were those unscrupulous enough
and skillful enough to use the deliberate or
reckless falsehood as an effective political tool
to unseat the public servant or even topple an
administration .... [T]he use of the known lie as
a tool is at once at odds with the premises of
democratic government and with the orderly
manner in which economic, social, or political
45
change is to be effected. 1
So there we have what is known as the Sullivan rule, a
substantial but incomplete immunity for unpleasant
comments on public officials.
But Justice Brennan did not leave it there. He went
on in his opinion to test the facts of the case against the
43

1

See
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144 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
141 Id. at 75.
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new rule, and found that the evidence in the record could
not constitutionally support a judgment for Commissioner
Sullivan. That was a highly unusual step. When laying
down a new or reformulated constitutional rule, the
Supreme Court would ordinarily remand the case to the
lower court to determine the rule's application to the facts
of the particular case. The reason for departing from the
ordinary is not in doubt. Justice Brennan feared that the
Alabama officials who had sued over the Times
advertisement would demand a new trial and try to show
that the statements in the ad were knowingly or recklessly
false. Justice Black, who came from Alabama, warned that
Sullivan and the others would persuade a jury to find
knowing or reckless fabrication. (In fact, Sullivan did not
seek a trial.)
In the course of measuring the evidence against the
constitutional standard, Justice Brennan did something
quite extraordinary. After finding no deliberate or reckless
falsehoods on the part of The Times, he said: "We also
think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another
respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury's finding
that the allegedly libelous statements were made 'of and
concerning' [Commissioner Sullivan]." 146 In other words,
by finding that an ad without his name could be understood
to defame Sullivan, the jury and the Alabama courts
violated the Constitution.
Think about that. It is an independent ground of
decision, unconnected to the whole argument about the
Sedition Act and the right to criticize officials. But then the
Supreme Court could have rested on that ground without
more. It could have decided the case and reversed the
judgment against The New York Times without taking the
bold step of laying down a new constitutional rule for libel.
The case would still be meaningful. The Alabama Supreme
146

376 U.S. at 288.
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Court had said it was logical to impute criticism of Sullivan
from general statements about police wrongdoing in the ad.
Justice Brennan's opinion stated that it would allow
criticism of government to be transmuted into personal
libel, and that this country has no such thing as libel of the
government. But it would hardly be the great decision it
was.
Why did Justice Brennan and the Court not rest on
that narrower ground? I think we have to conclude that the
Court thought it was the moment for a decision that would
ensure open channels of information about the racial crisis.
Justice Brennan did not frame his opinion in terms of Dr.
King's hope - the hope of arousing Americans to
understand the evils of racism. It is, in fact, a singularly
detached opinion. But the Court knew what was at stake.
One profound result of the decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan was to keep the channels of
information about the civil rights movement and its
opponents open. Dr. King's statement about how
Americans would react to racism when they saw it naked
proved to be correct. Americans pressed for federal
legislation guaranteeing the right to vote and other rights.
By the end of 1966, two years after the Sullivan decision,
that legislation was on the books. It led to profound
changes in American politics and society. I can, perhaps,
sum them up with a small story.
Ralph McGill was the great editor of the Atlanta
Constitution. He fought against racism for years, often in
lonely circumstances. Some years after the passage of the
civil rights laws, a friend came to his office and asked
McGill to come with him. They went to a hall where black
elected officials in the South were meeting. Ralph stood in
the back of the hall, and tears rolled down his face.
The decision remade the law of libel in this country.
Today, virtually every libel action engages the First
Amendment in some way. What was once a matter of state

11
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law has become a federal specialty. More broadly, this has
become a much freer country in terms of what we can
speak and publish.
Of course that freedom was not the sole result of the
Sullivan case. There has been a gradual trend toward
outspokenness, gathering momentum in the last fifty years.
It is hard to believe now that the Supreme Court, during
and after World War I, upheld criminal convictions for
political criticism of the President. I think freedom to say
and write what we will is stronger in America now than
ever, and greater than in any other country. The Sullivan
case was a spur to that trend.
Not everyone welcomes the world of uninhibited,
caustic, sometimes unpleasantly sharp criticism of public
officials. I have debated politicians on the subject, and they
can be explosively negative. The dissenting view these
politicians hold is that Sullivan has become a license for
shoddy journalism, transforming it into a profession where
legal excuses are sought for falsehood. They argue that the
atmosphere of continuous attack and investigation makes
political life hard to bear and discourages the thoughtful
and sensitive from going to it.
I cannot dismiss that argument out of hand. I think
the standards ofjournalism are less than lofty. We live in a
world in which an Internet purveyor of trash can put a
totally false rumor about a Presidential candidate on his
website, and tabloids around the world pick it up as
"news." I doubt, though, that this sensationalism and lack
of ethics can be traced to New York Times v. Sullivan, or
even to the zeal of today's journalists to look for official
wrongdoing.
Rather, the main source of that investigative zeal
lies in two transforming events: Vietnam and Watergate.
The leading columnists, Washington bureau chiefs, and the
like used to consider themselves on the same team as high
officials. I well remember how chummy my superiors at

12
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the Times were with Secretaries of State and the like, and it
was not evil. They shared premises, such as the need to
win the Cold War, and they respected officials' good faith
and superior knowledge.
Vietnam ended all that. Practically all of us in the
business came to doubt the superior knowledge of officials
about the war. In fact, David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan
and other young correspondents there knew more about the
war than Presidents did. Good faith? You had to wonder
about that, too.
Then came Watergate, with its lies and criminality.
It made us forever skeptical about official truth. One can
hardly blame that on the Sullivan case.
Am I, then, an unambiguous admirer of all that
Sullivan wrought? No, I am not. I think the Supreme
Court made a mistake when it extended the rule of the case
- the need to prove knowing or reckless falsification - from

public officials to public figures. The Court defined public
figures as either people generally well-known, like movie
stars, or people who have "thrust themselves into the
vortex" of public controversy, as Justice John Marshall
Harlan memorably put it. 147

The first step to enlarge the sphere of the Sullivan
case was taken by the Supreme Court in 1967, when it
decided Time, Inc. v. Hill,148 a privacy case. James Hill and
his family lived in a suburb of Philadelphia. Three escaped
convicts invaded their home and held the Hills hostage for
19 hours but treated them well. The press covered the story
intensely, to the distress of the family and especially of
Mrs. Hill, who greatly valued privacy. To escape the glare
of publicity, they moved to Connecticut and sought
obscurity.

147 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146 (1967).
148 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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Two years later, a play entitled "The Desperate
Hours" appeared on Broadway. It depicted a reign of terror
by convicts who held a family hostage and included
brutality and sexual threats. The play was set in
Indianapolis. Life magazine ran a feature on the opening
and photographed the actors in the Hills' former home near
Philadelphia. Life described the play, with all its terror, as
a reenactment of what had happened to the Hills.
The
Life story devastated the Hill family and caused Mrs. Hill
to suffer a psychiatric breakdown. Thereafter, Mr. Hill
sued Time, Inc., the publisher of Life, under the New York
privacy statute, claiming that the article placed his family in
a false light. He was awarded a modest $30,000 in
damages by the New York courts, but the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court's opinion, penned by Justice Brennan,
said the judgment was constitutionally flawed because Mr.
Hill had not been required to prove that Life's falsification
had been knowing or reckless.
What did James Hill, a private person, have to do
with the reasoning of New York Times v. Sullivan, or with
the Sedition Act controversy and its lesson that the central
meaning of the First Amendment is the right to criticize
those who govern us? My answer is-nothing. I think the
Court, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,149 applied the compelling logic
of Sullivan in a situation where it was quite inapposite.
As someone who thinks privacy is a crucially
important value in our increasingly intrusive society, I also
regret the Court's failure in the Hill case to give privacy the
weight it deserves. That was brought poignantly home
years after the decision. It happens that Richard M. Nixon
argued the case for Mr. Hill. His one-time law partner and
White House counsel, Leonard Garment, published an
article about the case in The New Yorker in 1989. He

14 9 Id.
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disclosed, with James Hill's permission, that in 1971 Mrs.
Hill had committed suicide.
Leonard Garment's article followed the disclosure
in Professor Bernard Schwartz's book, The Unpublished
Opinions of the Warren Court,150 of what went on inside
the Supreme Court during its consideration of the Hill case.
After it was first argued, the Justices voted, 6 to 3, to affirm
the New York court's judgment in favor of Mr. Hill. The
opinion was assigned to Justice Abe Fortas, who used the
occasion for two distinctive purposes: an eloquent
definition of privacy, and a savage attack on journalistic
ethics. As to the latter, Justice Fortas decried what he
called life's "needless, heedless, wanton and deliberate
injury." 151 He wrote that "magazine writers and editors are
not, by reason of their high office, relieved of the common
obligation to avoid inflicting wanton and unnecessary
injury." 52 Perhaps his sarcastic language helped to bring
about a switch in the Justices' votes; after a second round
of oral argument, the Court issued a 5-4 decision in favor of
Time, Inc. A compelling dissent by Justice Harlan opined
that the "marketplace of ideas" would not function in a case
like this because James Hill would have a hard time finding
a platform to answer Life magazine. 153 The case showed,
wrote Justice
Harlan, "the dangers of unchallengeable
untruth." 154
The more common extension of the Sullivan rule is
to libel actions brought by people who, though not officials,
are regarded as public figures. The consequences can be
curious. Wayne Newton, a Las Vegas entertainer, was
deemed a public figure when he sued for libel. Other
150 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE

WARREN COURT (1985).
151 Id.

152 Id.
153 385 U.S. at 407-08.
154 Id.at 408.
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singers and actors have had to meet the Sullivan test
because they were famous. But what, if anything, did they
have to do with government or public affairs? I should,
perhaps, add that my question would be different if the
actor were Arnold Schwarzenegger. The public figure
category would be more logical if it were limited to people
who have thrust themselves into the vortex of public
controversy. The Supreme Court may have taken an
unacknowledged step toward that limitation when it said in
1986 that a public figure who brings a libel action has to
meet the Sullivan test only if the suit concerns a "public
issue. 155
Despite my doubts about public figures and privacy,
I think the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan has been
a great liberating force in American law and life. I may
feel especially strongly on the subject because I spent nine
years of my life in England, where the old common law of
libel reigns in good part unchanged. In libel cases, the
burden of proof is on the defendant, usually a newspaper, to
prove that the challenged statement is true. That can be an
impossible burden to meet, so most newspapers give up and
settle when sued. Under Sullivan, as the Supreme Court
made clear in 1986, the burden is on a libel plaintiff to
prove falsity.
In Britain the plaintiff does not have to show any
fault on the part of the defendant. A newspaper writer and
editor may have made strenuous, good-faith efforts to
check everything before publishing an article, but if there is
an inadvertent error in the published article that defames
someone, that person can recover damages. Under
Sullivan, of course, a public official or public figure has a
high degree of fault to prove: knowing or reckless
falsification. Under the 1974 Supreme Court decision in

155

Phila Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
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Gertz v. Welch, 156 even a purely private plaintiff has to
show at least that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant in publishing a falsehood. Innocent mistake is
not subject to penalty.
Ladies and gentlemen, I said at the start that over
the years I realized from time to time that I had not
altogether understood the decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan. No doubt I still have some learning to do. With
its grand sweep and its mysterious turnings, Justice
Brennan's opinion is a challenge for all time - and what a
thrilling challenge it is.

156 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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